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Philanthropy and “Muslim Citizenship” in Post-Suharto 
Indonesia
Hilman Latief*
The spawning of Muslim philanthropic associations signifies an increasingly visible 
Islamic social and political activism, in Indonesia as elsewhere in the Muslim world. 
Acting as non-state welfare providers, the associations provide “social security” to 
poor and disadvantaged groups as a means of promoting the public good.  In the 
intricate relationship between state and citizen in the world’s largest Muslim coun-
try, Muslim philanthropic ideals of promoting the well-being of the community 
(ummah) are in turn contested.  Will they lead to a more democratic citizenship or 
to new types of clientelistic relations within a plural society?  This research deals 
with the following questions: To what extent are welfare issues perceived by Mus-
lim philanthropic organizations as shaping a new debate over “citizenship”?  Can 
the Islamic concept of ummah be reconciled with modern ideas of citizenship?
Keywords: Islamic philanthropy, citizenship, welfare, rights, ummah
Introduction
Welfare provision in a nation-state era has become an interesting issue to investigate. 
In many developing countries, economic growth is often hindered by an inadequacy of a 
reliable welfare system to benefit society at large.  Indonesia, the largest country in 
Southeast Asia, which is inhabited by more than 250 million people, seems to have suf-
fered from such an inadequacy.  After the fall of Suharto in the late 1990s, Indonesia 
recovered from the financial and political crises and then started experiencing consider-
able economic growth and democratization.  Nevertheless, an adequate welfare system 
that can reach all parts of society remains hard to find, despite the increased economic 
growth in the past 10 years.  The public does not easily accept Indonesian government 
statistics showing a decrease in the number of people living below the poverty line.  As 
such, statistical reports do not stop civic organizations from acting as non-state welfare 
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providers by trying to provide aid for particular segments of society unreachable by state 
welfare agencies.
In this increasingly democratic country, civic organizations with different social, 
religious, and political orientations have flourished.  In post-New Order Indonesia, civil 
society organizations have appeared publicly in different ways: as NGOs focusing on 
community development projects (Sinaga 1995; Hadiwinata 2003), as ethnic-based mass 
organizations supporting political institutions (Aspinall 2011), and as religion-based para-
military groups focusing on the imposition of religiously inspired public norms (Hasan 
2002; Jahroni 2004).  Others have appeared as voluntary welfare associations attempting 
to offer an alternative to the state’s role in fulfilling social needs.  These types of groups 
have had a massive presence in the public sphere.  One may argue that such a lively civic 
engagement in the public sphere can lead society to the achievement of democratic 
values, in a way comparable to what happened in the New Order era.  While this assump-
tion may be true in a certain context, the increasing participation of society in Indonesia’s 
political sphere may also lead to other consequences that are not necessarily suitable for 
democratic values.  Corruption, collusion, clientelism, new authoritarian culture, preda-
tory political groupings, social disparity, and economic inequality are examples of how 
civil society in a democratic era is still “burdened” by undemocratic behavior (Aspinall 
and Van Klinken 2011).
This paper examines the roles of Muslim volunteer organizations—which are 
referred to as Islamic philanthropic associations—in shaping the nature of democratic 
culture in Indonesia and analyzes their contribution to the creation of a just society. 
Studies suggest that in the past three decades Islamic philanthropic associations in Indo-
nesia have had a vibrant public presence, more than ever before.  They have actively 
engaged in various types of social projects to cater for the poor, as well as had a profound 
impact on Muslim discourse on welfare issues (Fauzia 2013; Latief 2014; Retsikas 2014). 
The objectives of Islamic philanthropic organizations, as reflected in their organizational 
mission, include fostering social justice and bettering the welfare of society.  In practice, 
Islamic philanthropic organizations provide aid for those in need, including low-income 
families, orphans, disaster victims, and refugees in city slums and disaster-affected areas. 
Given the wide range of Islamic philanthropic activism in Indonesia, this paper examines 
Muslims’ understanding of citizenship and how they interpret people’s rights and the 
state’s responsibility by analyzing two cases.  The first case concerns the role of Islamic 
philanthropic organizations in validating the rights of the poor.  The second is about how 
Islamic philanthropic organizations define the rights of underprivileged minority groups, 
including Shi’a and Ahmadiyya communities, and whether or not these groups deserve 
assistance from their fellow Muslims.
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Citizenship: The State, Welfare, and Volunteerism
Analysts have tried to relate benevolent deeds and traditional philanthropy to the role of 
the state as the main welfare provider in certain countries.  Some have looked at philan-
thropy vis-à-vis the state in offering social security.  The public sector and voluntary 
sector are often situated at opposite poles.  Philanthropic organizing is seen as a “social 
innovation” of civil society and an active counterbalance to “excessive state bureaucracy” 
(Villadsen 2011, 1059).  From this point of view, philanthropic activism arose as a response 
to the state’s inadequacy in sustaining a welfare system and alleviating distress (Latief 
2010; Fauzia 2013).  Thus, the social and political engagement of philanthropic organiza-
tions in public life signifies an attempt by civil society to fill the vacuum left by the state 
(Clark 2004).
Other observers and practitioners seem to be interested in reconciling philanthropy 
and volunteer organizations with the state.  According to this “co-operative paradigm,” 
the relationship between philanthropy and the state is marked by “collaboration, overlaps, 
and interdependency” (Villadsen 2011, 1059).  Hence, the roles of volunteer organizations 
complement the state-based welfare agenda.  In this respect, philanthropic associations 
can “help citizens to learn the civic virtues of trust, moderation, compromise, reciprocity, 
and the skills of democratic discussion and organization”; and through their well- organized 
social welfare-oriented activities, they can “link individuals’ private interests to broader 
community interests” (Eikenberry 2007, 858).
Philanthropic activities by volunteer organizations and individuals in order to 
strengthen grassroots social security are perceived mainly as individual and collective 
benevolent deeds.  We should note that from the state’s perspective, volunteer activities 
may symbolize “active citizenship” as opposed to “passive citizenship” or “negative 
citizenship” (Finlayson 1994, 15–16; Stokes 2008, 86–87).  In sum, to discuss charity and 
philanthropy in a nation-state, we can employ ideas of citizenship as a framework—not 
only to evaluate whether voluntarism has rightly functioned to stand in for the state’s 
role in offering welfare provision but, more important, to understand to what extent 
philanthropy is changing citizens’ attitudes toward the state and interpretations of the 
state.  The engagement of philanthropic organizations signifies “the citizenship of con-
tribution” (Finlayson 1994, 12), which differs from “the citizenship of entitlement.”  It 
can be said, therefore, that volunteer activity in a Muslim charity can be an expression 
of citizenship in the second sense but at the same time it might also be driven by convic-
tions that other citizens have certain welfare rights that a community needs to provide 
for.
Due to the multilayered meanings of citizenship and philanthropy in today’s world, 
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it is interesting to relate the modern concept of citizenship to the Muslim idea of ummah. 
Ummah is a religious and ideological concept of the political community.  In Islamic lit-
erature, the meaning of ummah is normatively juxtaposed with that of “nation,” which 
points to a group of people “to which an individual may have a sense of belonging and 
attachment” (Kamali 2009, 124, 130).  The literature suggests that there are at least two 
streams of thought about how ummah is formulated in Muslim societies.  The first is the 
inclusive nature of ummah.  The normative meaning of ummah is associated with the 
Quranic concept of people or nation (syu’ub) and tribes (qabail), according to which the 
most notable people in the sight of God are the most righteous of them (Qur’anic Verses 
49: 13).  As for the concept of the state in early Islam, scholars refer to the Constitution 
of Medina, which is believed to be the earliest form of the state in Islamic history.  Prophet 
Muhammad protected the residents of Medina, who comprised different tribes and reli-
gious groups (Lubis 2008, 79; Kamali 2009, 124).  The inclusive nature of ummah is 
indicated in M. Hashim Kamali’s studies:
The Prophet-cum-head of state himself did not insist on embracing Islam as a precondition of 
citizen ship.  The Constitution of Medina acknowledged and declared the Jews of Medina to be part 
of the ummah that the Prophet organized immediately after his migration to Medina.  Moreover, 
there is nowhere a requirement in the source of Shari’a to say that a non-Muslim resident, the 
so-called dhimmi, must become Muslim first before he or she can become a citizen of an Islamic 
state. (2009, 125)
The above quotation suggests that in the cosmopolitan city of Medina, religion was 
not the main factor determining the citizenship status of residents.  This postulation is 
supported by the prophetic narratives (hadith) putting emphasis on the egalitarian prin-
ciples within ummah: “People are equal as are the teeth of a comb.  There is no merit 
for an Arab over a non-Arab; merit is by piety” (Salam 1997).  Accordingly, “distinctions 
based on rank, wealth, kinship or race were not recognized” (ibid., 134).  Therefore, 
people of a different race, religion, or ethnicity residing in an Islamic state are entitled to 
equal rights and treatment from the state.
Nevertheless, there is also an exclusive nature of citizenship in Muslim society that 
indicates an idea of exclusion.  Based on historical accounts, observers relate the idea of 
citizenship in Muslim societies to dâr al-Islam (Abode of Peace, or House of Islam).  In 
the classical form of the Islamic state, citizenship was—and could be—distinguished not 
only by people’s membership in political communities but also by their religious affilia-
tion.  According to this view, citizens are those who follow and embrace the Islamic faith 
in an Islamic state.  Non-Muslim inhabitants (referred to as dhimmis) who take up domi-
cile in an Islamic state are considered second-class citizens.  Therefore, observers argue 
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that the early form of citizenship in Muslim societies could be less egalitarian (Kamali 
2009, 122) and thus non-Muslims could “neither acquire the equal status” nor enjoy their 
“equal rights” (Salam 1997, 134).  As to the reasons why non-Muslims were considered 
second-class citizens in the early form of ummah, Nawaf A. Salam notes: “Islam, strictly 
speaking, did not know citizenship . . . and the ummah as a political community, being 
exclusively based on jus religionis, the Dhimmi(s) did not qualify for membership.”  Salam 
also suggests that the dhimmi(s) “could not enjoy, accordingly, the same rights as those 
accorded to Muslims, but neither were they obligated by the same duties” (ibid.).1)
The aforementioned competing streams of understanding of citizenship are based 
on experiences of Muslim society where the modern concept of a nation-state was still 
absent.  Both inclusive and exclusive concepts of citizenship in early Islam are relevant 
to our discussion about how the state and society attempt to satisfy the rights of citizens. 
It appears that the rise of a modern nation-state as a result of the decline of Western 
colonialism in Muslim regions in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries has changed 
Muslim understanding of citizenship.2)  In a modern nation-state system, the political 
community is not restricted to certain religious groups but can cover all members of the 
community regardless of their religion.  But among Muslims, the unity of ummah still 
becomes an essential issue.  In fact, ummah has been a central idea that justifies Muslims’ 
social, economic, and political activities.  Ummah has also been imagined as an ideal 
concept of the Islamic community, blurring geographical boundaries between Muslim 
nations.  Inter-state relationships and globalization have transformed the elements of 
citizenship in general, and ummah in particular, from what was simply local society resid-
ing in certain regions into “global citizens” or “transnational citizenship” (Hutchings and 
Dannreuther 1999; Stokes 2000; 2004).
The emerging public appearance of Muslim social and political activism has had 
far-reaching consequences for the revitalization of the Muslim ideal of the “Islamic com-
munity.”  Similar interests among community members, for example, have enabled Mus-
lim societies with social concerns to establish and expand their networks nationally and 
internationally.  In his study on transnational Islamic NGOs in Chad, Mayke Kaag argues 
that the flow of humanitarian aid brought by transnational Islamic NGOs is inspired by 
1) It is worth mentioning that Islamic egalitarianism within the early form of ummah is also challenged 
by the fact that slaves and women did not have equal rights (Salam 1997, 135).
2) Sami Zubaida in his study on the constitution and shari’a in Egypt found that a number of Egyptian 
Muslim intellectuals who supported Islamization, such as Adel Hussein, Fahmi Huwaydi, Tariq 
al-Bishry, and Muhammad Amara, seemed to be “liberal” in conceiving the status of non-Muslims 
in the Muslim constitution.  They believed that “full citizenship rights for Christians is fully com-
patible with the shari’a” (Zubaida 2005, 179).
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the “idea of Muslim solidarity” and has functioned as a way “to bring (more) people 
(closer) to God” (Kaag 2007, 94).  Therefore, dakwah (Islamic proselytizing) is embedded 
in humanitarian activities, and vice versa.  In areas where both Muslim and Christian 
missionaries are active, Islamic transnational philanthropic organizations provide human-
itarian aid with the aim of competing with Christian NGOs.  Kaag further notes, “it is 
generally considered a Muslim’s duty to help and expand the ummah, and it follows from 
the foregoing that this expansion can be interpreted in both a moral and a territorial way” 
(ibid.).
Similar findings can be seen in the work of Marie Juul Petersen, who questions 
whether the aid offered by Islamic philanthropic organizations is primarily for the sake 
of humanity or ummah.  Petersen (2011) compares two types of “aid culture” that have 
characterized Muslim philanthropy: “Islamic aid culture” and “Western development 
culture.”  She argues that Islamic aid associations from Gulf countries, such as the Inter-
national Islamic Relief Organization (established in Jeddah in 1978) and the International 
Islamic Charitable Organization (established in Kuwait in 1984), with their “Islamic aid 
culture” apparently attempt to adopt a Western development perspective in their organ-
izational mission.  In the same way, Islamic Relief and Muslim Aid, two Islamic aid 
organizations founded in the United Kingdom in 1984 and 1985 respectively, emerged 
with a Western development style but at the same time “seek to maintain a strong rela-
tionship to the culture of Islamic aid” (ibid., 15).
More important, the role played by Islamic philanthropic organizations in the inter-
national arena, such as helping in disaster- and conflict-affected areas, can also be justified 
by the idea of solidarity and unity of the community of believers (Kochuyt 2009, 105–106; 
Petersen 2011, 146–147).  In sum, domestic philanthropic associations in certain areas 
can be linked to global society, and thus they can operate not only to relieve the poor in 
their neighborhood but also to overcome crises on other continents.  Ideas of the “global 
citizen” among Muslims have inspired and compelled advocates of Islamic volunteer 
organizations to operate in the international arena.  Hence, the terms “global charities” 
and “transnational philanthropy” signify the rise of what Olivier Roy (2004) terms “glo-
balized Islam” as a result of the globalization of ummah (Lubeck 2002).
Islamic Philanthropy and the Rights of the Poor Ummah
The proliferation of Islamic charities in Indonesia indicates that there has been an active 
effort within Muslim communities to define the rights and obligations of society.  Muslims 
are urged to donate a portion of their wealth as a means of fulfilling religious duties and 
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helping those in need.  The practice of giving has increasingly become a concern among 
Muslims, who are willing either to pay zakat (almsgiving/Islamic tax) through charitable 
organizations or to directly channel their money to the masses.  In the past, every Mus-
lim whose wealth or annual wage reached a certain minimum amount (equivalent to the 
price of 85 grams of gold) was obligated to pay 2.5–5 percent zakat to appointed institu-
tions, usually state-sponsored zakat organizations (‘amil).  But over time the nature of 
zakat practice among Muslims has changed considerably thanks to the rise of community 
or civil society-based zakat organizations (see Benthall and Jourdan 2003).
There are at least two types of zakat organizations in Indonesia.  The first are those 
established by civil society, referred to as Lembaga Amil Zakat (LAZ).  While in the past 
zakat organizations were not registered, in recent times civil society-based zakat organ-
izations, including charitable and humanitarian organizations, are required to be regis-
tered and recognized by the government, especially the Ministry of Law and Human 
Rights and the Ministry of Religious Affairs.  Some charitable organizations are registered 
with the Ministry of Social Affairs, as they appear publicly as humanitarian organizations 
even though they receive donations, including zakat, from the public.  Although there are 
some zakat organizations that are legalized and recognized by the government, many 
small-scale ones have never registered but remain active in collecting zakat funds from 
Muslim benefactors.
The second type includes state-sponsored but autonomous zakat organizations 
known as Badan Amil Zakat Nasional (BAZNAS).  The inception of BAZNAS has several 
implications.  From a political perspective, the state policy on Islamic philanthropy indi-
cates that the state facilitated Muslim religious and political aspirations by specifically 
and directly sponsoring BAZNAS.  BAZNAS, which was officially legalized through Pres-
idential Decree No. 8 Year 2001, is the only state-sponsored national zakat agency in 
Indonesia.  Apart from having the right and opportunity to collect public funds through 
fund-raising and zakat collection from state workers and private companies, BAZNAS 
receives “subsidies” from the government.  It is an autonomous and non-structural state 
agency under the supervision of the Ministry of Religious Affairs.  According to the Zakat 
Organizing Law issued in 1999, BAZNAS had a similar duty, responsibility, and position 
to that of civil society-based zakat organizing.  However, the 1999 Law was amended 
when in 2011 the government issued the Zakat Law.  The latter provides more latitude 
for BAZNAS to manage zakat funds.  BAZNAS functions not only as a regulator that can 
assess zakat organizing, but also as an operator that directly manages zakat funds.  As a 
state-sponsored agency, BAZNAS has been able to build a partnership with both state 
bureaucracies and private corporations.  Justified by the Zakat Law as well as government 
regulations at the provincial and district levels, which are referred to as “Shari’a-by law,” 
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BAZNAS regularly obtains zakat funds from Muslim employees of government offices.
In 2010, BAZNAS claimed that the potential zakat funds to be collected in Indonesia 
totaled about 217 trillion rupiah.  However, in practice the combined Indonesian zakat 
agencies collected only 1.5 trillion rupiah.  In comparison, the government obtained 723.3 
trillion rupiah in tax the same year.  Because of this envisaged large amount of money, 
BAZNAS, together with other civil society-based zakat agencies, actively engages in 
fund-raising to finance various types of social enterprises.  As the state-sponsored zakat 
agency, BAZNAS focuses on different forms of development projects; but most of them 
are under the framework of dakwah (religious proselytizing) and the notion of ummah. 
BAZNAS’s ideas of ummah, in particular, are expressed partly in the provision of 
scholar ship for Muslim preachers as a way to combat Islamic liberalism and prevent 
Christianization.
It is worth noting that thanks to the enthusiasm of Indonesian zakat mobilization, 
which was in line with the rapid development of global Islamic charities, in 2007 Indo-
nesia was entrusted to be the host of the inaugural World Zakat Forum.  The forum or 
conference was formed by zakat collector activists in Indonesia and Malaysia and sup-
ported by other Muslim countries.  It aims at energizing zakat activism and strengthen-
ing the vision of zakat organizations in projecting their capacity and potential.  The first 
World Zakat Forum conference was held in 2010 in Yogyakarta, where hundreds of 
representatives of zakat organizations from many parts of the world met and shared their 
experience and vision of zakat.  The title of the conference was “To Strengthen the Role 
of Zakat in Realizing the Welfare of the Ummah through International Zakat Network.” 
The second World Zakat Forum conference was held in New York City in 2014, with the 
title “Zakat for Global Welfare.”  These two conferences, which were organized by Indo-
nesian zakat activists, focused on welfare issues and poverty eradication around the 
world.  At a glance, it seems that there has been a widening of orientation in determining 
targeted zakat beneficiaries, from simply strengthening the welfare of the ummah to 
global welfare.
Unlike other conferences on zakat that were focused mainly on the welfare of Islamic 
communities, the panelists in the second World Zakat Forum brought up some interest-
ing points about inclusivity in zakat distribution.  Zakat was defined in a broader context, 
such as how zakat funds could be used to overcome the problem of discrimination among 
minority groups, strengthen interfaith initiatives, and promote social solidarity with non-
Muslims.  It is under these circumstances that zakat for global welfare is defined.  For 
Muslims in Indonesia as well as other countries, the points proposed in the second World 
Zakat Forum can shape the nature of philanthropic practices projected to protect under-
privileged groups, including among the minority.  This is partly because over the years 
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minority groups have faced a lot of difficulty due to tensions with the majority.
As mentioned earlier, many people prefer channeling their zakat and charity funds 
directly to the poor.  The practice of direct giving—with the masses queueing up for small 
amouts of cash—has characterized the practice of zakat distribution in Indonesia for many 
years.  There have been some cases where this method of zakat distribution even caused 
deaths.  The most notable incident occurred in mid-September 2008, when a local Mus-
lim entrepreneur in Pasuruan, East Java, distributed his zakat.  There was a disordered 
mass of people awaiting their share, and with the congestion and lack of fresh air, 21 
people died and many others sustained serious injuries.  This incident became a religious, 
legal, social, and political issue.  The Indonesian Ulama Council (MUI) insisted that direct 
zakat distribution was illegal and prohibited, because zakat funds should be redistributed 
to beneficiaries through appropriate institutions.  The MUI emphasized that it was one’s 
right to deliver aid directly to people in need but that the extent to which zakat funds 
were distributed should be in line with Islamic principles.  In an effort to prevent any 
harmful effects of zakat distribution, the MUI argued that distributing funds without 
engaging ‘amil, whether civil society-based or state-sponsored, was religiously inappro-
priate and socially unethical, because asking the poor to queue in front of the rich was 
humiliating to the poor.
The story does not end here.  It snowballed, reaching wider audiences.  One of the 
family members who distributed zakat in Pasuruan voiced his disagreement with the 
MUI’s opinion.  While emphasizing his family’s right to share their wealth with the poor 
without necessarily engaging ‘amil, he argued that the government should thank his 
family for their willingness to help the poor rather than accusing them of wrongdoing. 
According to him, this tragedy was a result of the government’s lack of effort to alleviate 
poverty, especially after the increase in oil prices a few months before Ramadan.  He also 
argued that since the government had not provided an appropriate welfare system the 
number of needy people in the countryside had increased rapidly.
On national television, talk shows hosted public debates to examine the issue.  One 
of the speakers was the sociologist Imam B. Prasodjo, who said that the matter of poverty 
and social welfare was in the state’s hands but that local philanthropic organizations were 
also able to participate in empowering the community.  Therefore, although there were 
official zakat collectors, their presence should not eliminate informal institutions organ-
ized by communities.  According to Prasodjo, the Indonesian government was less able 
to identify and provide accurate numbers of poor people around the country, because the 
government did not have reliable databases to be used for purposes such as general elec-
tions, social security policy, and zakat distribution.  He suggested that Indonesian citizens 
be provided with a social security number, as in developed countries.
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Aid for Minority Groups
According to the 2012 annual report on Religious Life in Indonesia issued by the Center 
for Religious and Cultural Studies, Gadjah Mada University, communal and religious 
conflicts in Indonesia have been characterized by a rapidly escalating tension between 
majority and minority religious groups.  Observers and social activists have questioned 
the role of the state in protecting minority groups in Indonesia and how the latter could 
gain their rights.  The accusations brought against minority groups such as Ahmadiyyah 
and Shi’a by certain groups of the Sunni majority have been among the intriguing cases, 
leading us to raise questions about citizenship in Indonesia.  In mid-2012 there was a riot 
in Sampang District of Madura Island, East Java, displacing hundreds of Shi’a families 
from their hometowns and forcing them to live in “refugee camps” (sports buildings) for 
about three months.  In the villages, some of the homes belonging to Shi’a families were 
burned, jeopardizing the future of the Shi’a minority in that region.  Surprisingly, the 
Sunni leaders in the area of conflict said that the Shi’a could not return to their villages 
unless they converted to Sunni Islam.  As the Shi’a refused to alter their beliefs, it was 
hard for them to return home.  In that situation, the government offered an unpalatable 
option to Shi’a families: relocation from their hometown in Sampang to another region 
in Sidoarjo.
Relations between Sunnis and Shi’a in Indonesia became increasingly complex after 
the issuance of a fatwa (legal/religious opinion) by the MUI, according to which Shi’a was 
a deviant form of Islam.  The minority Ahmadis faced a similar situation as some Indo-
nesian Sunni Muslim groups became radicalized, losing their sense of tolerance.  Riots 
took place mainly in West Java—in places such as Bogor, Kuningan, and Tasikmalaya—
in which Ahmadi communities, including their homes and places of worship, were 
attacked (Crouch 2009; Burhani 2014a; Formici 2014).  In response to this, people started 
questioning the state’s role and reluctance to protect minority groups.  They also ques-
tioned why the state, represented by government officials, failed to help the refugees 
return to their villages.  At the same time, the MUI did not make a decisive effort to 
resolve this Sunni-Shi’a conflict.
Conflicts between majority and minority Muslim groups have put Muslim philan-
thropic organizations in a delicate situation.  In conflicts between Muslims and non-
Muslims, such as that in the Moluccas—Ambon—a decade ago, a number of Muslim 
solidarity groups and philanthropic organizations were present to provide relief.  On the 
other hand, if Muslim philanthropic organizations were to deliver aid to minority groups 
attacked by the majority, it may raise criticism from conservative groups.  After the 2012 
riot the local government in East Java did not even allow Shi’a refugees to return home 
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to visit their families after Ramadan to celebrate Eid al-Fitr, due to security reasons.  It 
is also worth noting that the discourse among religious leaders in Sampang, including 
MUI members, never included ideas of maslahah or benevolent action to cater for those 
Shi’a refugees.  The religious authorities have not raised the issue of the rights of Shi’a 
as Indonesian citizens, to show the ulama’s concern about the problem.  Nor have local 
MUI members talked about reconciliation, forgiveness, and the need to distribute zakat 
funds to refugees.
Then Minister of Religious Affairs Surya Dharma Ali, who was also the chairman of 
an Islamic Party (PPP, Partai Persatuan Pembangunan), never showed a serious com-
mitment to protect the minority’s rights.  Instead, as reflected by his statements, the 
minister urged the perceived “deviant” minority groups to show repentance and to con-
vert to “true Islam.”3)  Like the MUI’s fatwas, the minister’s statements in some way 
have had serious repercussions for the minority groups because his unfriendly state-
ments could justify violent acts by radical and conservative groups toward the minority. 
Unlike Surya Dharma Ali, newly appointed Minister of Religious Affairs Lukman Hakim 
Saifuddin, who is also a PPP politician, made the clear statement—as quoted by mass 
media—that “in principle, every citizen has the same rights to stay in the village and pray 
according to their belief because the state constitution protects them.”4)  Saifuddin also 
rejected efforts by local religious leaders in Sidoarjo, East Java, to convert Shi’a refugees 
to Sunni Islam, saying that the majority should treat their fellow Shi’a with more respect.
It is in this combative context that the way in which faith-based humanitarian organ-
izations define beneficiaries is contested, and the way in which it is decided whether or 
not refugees and disadvantaged minority groups receive aid from faith-based humanitarian 
and philanthropic organizations.  Whereas there were a number of Islamic philanthropic 
organizations active in raising funds from the public, only a few of them were willing to 
openly provide aid for Shi’a refugees in Sampang, Madura.  Surprisingly, the modernist 
Muhammadiyah—through its MDMC (Muhammadiyah Disaster Management Center)—
provided assistance to the Shi’a refugees.  As Indonesia’s largest modernist Muslim 
association, Muhammadiyah has been active in humanitarian and welfare- oriented activ-
3) Wawancara Menteri Agama soal Syiah di Sampang (Interview with the Minister of Religious Affairs 
on Shia in Sampang), July 27, 2013, http://nasional.tempo.co/read/news/2013/07/27/173500167/
wawancara-menteri-agama-soal-syiah-di-sampang, accessed February 2, 2016.
4) Lukman Hakim Saifuddin is the son of Saifuddin Zuhri, who was the minister of religious affairs in 
the 1960s.  Before his involvement in a political party, Lukman Hakim was active in the Nahdlatul 
Ulama and became the chairman of NU’s think-tank organization, LAKPESDAM, in the mid-1990s. 
See Rico Afrido, Rekonsiliasi tak harus ubah keyakinan seseorang (Reconciliation does not change 
somebody’s faith), SindoNews, August 13, 2013, http://nasional.sindonews.com/read/770818/15/
rekonsiliasi-tak-harus-ubah-keyakinan-seseorang-1376370137, accessed February 2, 2016.
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ities since its inception in the early twentieth century (Nakamura 2012).  After its tsunami 
relief in Aceh (2004) and earthquake relief in Yogyakarta (2006), MDMC increasingly 
became known, both nationally and internationally, as Muhammadiyah’s division spe-
cifically working on disaster relief.  As noted by Robin Bush, MDMC’s role in disaster 
relief “represents an important innovation and will influence the direction of future inter-
national humanitarian assistance” (2015, 34).
MDMC has focused on assisting vulnerable groups among the children and elderly 
by, among other measures, providing emergency education for the children of Shi’a 
refugees.  Children became increasingly vulnerable because their relationships with 
parents deteriorated with the parents’ increasing psychological stress.  MDMC’s chair-
man, Budi Setiawan, explained that although MDMC represents an Islamic humanitarian 
organization, this does not mean it can only work with—or distribute aid only to—certain 
groups.  The Shi’a minority in Sampang were victims, and therefore, according to 
Setiawan, they should be treated equally by humanitarian organizations—just like the 
victims of other man-made disasters.  Setiawan said:
The aim of providing aid for Shi’a refugees is to fulfill their basic needs and rights.  There has been 
a trend in interpreting al-Maun, a Quranic surah that has underpinned Muhammadiyah’s social 
engagement.  In the past, we might have believed that we provided assistance to refugees because 
they needed help.  But now we also have to think that we help them because they have the right 
to be assisted according to the standards of humanitarian principles.  We provide assistance for 
Shi’a refugees to fulfill their right to have sufficient food, appropriate education, and health care as 
well as safety or well-being. (interview, April 5, 2015)
The quotation above signifies a new understanding and meaning of aiding the poor in the 
context of Indonesian Muslim philanthropy, from simply carrying out religious duties to 
fulfilling people’s rights.  This understanding emerged partly because state agencies as 
welfare providers were often reluctant to take the risk of providing full support for minor-
ity groups due to strong pressure from majority groups or bureaucratic mechanisms.  In 
this context, Setiawan said: “We have seen that the state agencies somehow were weak 
and very bureaucratic.  Many refugees could not access the local government’s health 
services and education only because the refugees did not bring their ID (KTP)” (inter-
view, April 5, 2015).
Another major humanitarian organization active in providing assistance for Shi’a 
refugees is YEU (Yakkum Emergency Unit), a Christian NGO specializing in health, 
emergency relief, and development.  To run its program effectively, YEU has set up a 
partnership with a Shi’a organization (Ahlul Bait Indonesia) and MDMC.  YEU and MDMC 
as humanitarian organizations have shared a concern with defining the rights of refugees. 
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For these two faith-based humanitarian organizations, the main duty is to provide assis-
tance so that refugees can satisfy their basic needs and rights, such as education, health 
care, and well-being.  Meanwhile, advocacy NGOs such as KONTRAS5) and YLBHI6) have 
attempted to advocate for the Shi’a communities by urging the government to sharpen 
its policy about the refugees’ future.  KONTRAS and YLBHI pay close attention to the 
rights of refugees to live in their village.  They have urged the government to give back 
the minorities’ right to return to their village in Sampang.  Meanwhile, MDMC and YEU’s 
main concern is how to effectively provide aid.  The different views and methods of faith-
based humanitarian NGOs (MDMC and YEU) and advocacy NGOs (KONTRAS and 
YLBHI) in defining and establishing the rights of refugees have given rise to tensions 
during humanitarian missions.
A similar, or even worse, situation has been experienced by members of the Ahmadi 
minority, who have for nearly 10 years lived in a “refugee camp” in Transito, Mataram, 
and an ex-hospital in Central Lombok, West Nusa Tenggara.  They were driven there in 
the aftermath of severe riots and violence in 2006 that forced them to leave their villages. 
They had great difficulty getting assistance from government agencies, notably in health 
care and education, because many of them did not hold an ID.  Although a number of 
NGOs have attempted to push the government to provide assistance and protection as 
well as to revive the Ahmadis’ civil rights, it appears that the government cannot do much 
more to help them.  Further, there has not been any information about Islamic charitable 
organizations attempting to deliver aid to the refugees.  By contrast, in other cities—such 
as Bandung, Tasikmalaya, and Kuningan in West Java—BAZNAS channeled charitable 
funds to ex-Ahmadis or those who converted from Ahmadiyya to Sunni Islam.  In this 
context, ex-Ahmadis are seen as muallaf, or “new converts,” and according to normative 
Islamic teachings they deserve zakat funds.  The above case suggests that some Sunnis 
are still reluctant to see minority groups such as Shi’a and Ahmadis as part of the ummah 
and deserving of aid like other Sunni Muslims.  In sum, understanding the concept of 
ummah has shaped the pattern of Islamic philanthropy, determining whether it is inclu-
sive or exclusive in character.
5) KONTRAS stands for Komisi untuk Orang Hilang dan Korban Tindak Kekerasan (Commission for 
Disappeared and Victims of Violence).  It is an NGO working on human rights and was founded by 
a number of civil society organizations in March 1998 in response to violent and repressive actions 
by the state that caused the disappearance, killing, or injury of many activists.
6) YLBHI stands for Yayasan Lembaga Bantuan Hukum Indonesia (Indonesian Legal Aid Foundation). 
It is a civil society organization whose work focuses on human rights and fostering a transparent 
legal system in Indonesia.
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Rethinking Muslim Citizenship
From the above discussion it can be argued that Muslim philanthropy in Indonesia, just 
like in other countries, has to cope with a wide range of issues, including welfare, majority- 
minority relations, conflict, and state bureaucracy.  The pattern of philanthropic practice 
in underpinning a democratic culture is also contingent upon various factors, such as 
ethnicity, religious identity, and understanding of citizen rights.  While citizenship 
remains understood in a secular perspective, the question to be asked is: Can the current 
social and political setting in Indonesia shape a particular form of Muslim citizenship?  In 
their study of religious pluralism and multiculturalism in Indonesia and Australia, Lyn 
Parker and Chang-Yau Hoon argue that religion or religious principles can be inserted 
in recent discussions of citizenship.  The idea of “religious citizenship” therefore can be 
defined and put forward in the contemporary context of the nation-state era, partly 
because religious identity still matters in many societies.  Unlike in many Western soci-
eties, where religion has undergone a rigorous privatization process, in the Muslim 
world—including Indonesia—there is an increasing presence of religion in the public 
sphere (Parker and Hoon 2013, 162; Weng 2014).
In concert with the function of religion in shaping people’s social and political iden-
tity, ethnicity is another major factor shaping the type of religious citizenship in Muslim 
societies.  Muslims believe that they are part of the larger ummah.  However, Muslims 
have also become part of local ethnicities, which has been instrumental in forming their 
social, cultural, and political identities.  In this regard, the concept of ummah is under-
stood in different ways by Indonesian Muslims depending on the social and political 
context.  Michael Merry and Jeffrey Milligan note that for the Acehnese, the concept of 
ummah Islamiyyah
. . . is not necessarily antithetical to a sense of Indonesian citizenship, as was experienced briefly 
in the period of Acehnese involvement in the Indonesian independence struggle.  Nor is it any 
guarantor of a common sense of citizenship within a larger Muslim state, as the long-running 
struggle for Acehnese independence from Indonesia demonstrates. (2009, 318)
They also argue that “despite the philosophical and theological ideal of ummah 
Islamiyyah, ethnicity remains an important dimension of identity construction and nego-
tiation in Aceh and, presumably, other Muslim societies” (ibid.; see also Fadel 2012).
It is under these circumstances that religion should not be sidelined in discussions 
of citizenship, partly because there are “multiple identities” attached to the meaning of 
citizenship in a multicultural society (Merry and Milligan 2009, 320).  In the era of glo-
balization, Muslims’ understanding of ummah is influenced not only by their local identity 
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as members of a certain ethnic group or as citizens of a state, but also by their identifica-
tion with transnational Islamic movements whose religious and political ideologies may 
differ from the ethnic groups or the state to which they are affiliated.  It is not easy to 
reconcile different entities (citizen of the state, member of an ethnic group, or follower 
of a certain religion).  Muslims’ philanthropic activities are thus challenged by these 
cultural, sociological, and political complexities.
Religious citizenship in general, and Muslim citizenship in particular, can be under-
stood as a new element in the complex meaning of citizenship.  The complexity of the 
social, cultural, and political context may result in the birth of various meanings and 
categories of citizenship.  Anthropologists, in fact, have discovered different qualifying 
adjectives for the term “citizenship,” such as agrarian citizenship, biological citizenship, 
pharmaceutical citizenship, formal citizenship, substantive citizenship, etc. (Lazar 2013, 
15).  In the context of this paper, Muslim citizenship can attach to citizens’ rights, respon-
sibility, and obligation to other members of the community.  Helping, caring for, and 
fulfilling the needs of members of the communities are among the rights and obligations 
of each community member.  Likewise, although studies have pointed out that through 
the concept of citizenship democratic culture can be promoted and that the two should 
be linked, we can also note that citizenship meaning “membership of a political commu-
nity” can still exist, even in a non-democratic state (ibid., 4).
Conclusion
The development of philanthropic activism in Muslim societies contributes to the pattern 
of the current academic discourse on citizenship.  First of all, the idea of Muslim citizen-
ship is characterized by the incorporation of religion into the rights, obligations, and 
responsibilities of members of the community.  Inspired and motivated by religious duty, 
Muslims are required to contribute to the community by sharing their wealth in order to 
help the needy and in turn foster the public good.  This kind of benevolent action in the 
form of sharing and caring is mandatory according to Islamic teachings.  Muslim philan-
thropy is managed by Muslims, contributed to by Muslims, and dispensed mainly for the 
betterment of the Islamic community.  The governments of Muslim countries, such as 
Indonesia, have also facilitated, endorsed, as well as created laws to regulate such reli-
giously inspired philanthropic practices.  Likewise, in the global context, there are a 
number of Islamic philanthropic organizations that have transformed into transnational 
Islamic organizations catering to members of the Islamic community in various parts of 
the world.
H. Latief284
Nevertheless, when it comes to the broader context of society, the form of citizen-
ship is always contested when it deals with “the other,” including non-Muslims and 
minority groups.  In practical terms, there are two contesting orientations of Muslim 
philanthropic activism: to be exclusive in character by serving and supporting only those 
community members with a similar religious affiliation; or to be inclusive and cater to 
those in need regardless of religion, political affiliation, race, and ethnicity.  In the Indo-
nesian context, both types of activism—exclusive Muslim philanthropy and inclusive 
philanthropy—have characterized Muslim social activism.  In a nutshell, while there have 
been rigorous efforts by Muslims to foster a democratic culture, a just society, and the 
public good through volunteerism and philanthropic practices, there are obstacles to 
contend with, such as clientelism in the practice of philanthropy (Latief 2013).  Therefore, 
the meanings of Muslim citizenship and ummah in the nation-state era are still being 
contested among Indonesian Muslims.
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